We investigate the extent to which misperceptions about the economy can become self reinforcing and thereby contribute to time-varying macroeconomic dynamics. To do so, we build a New Keynesian model with long-horizon expectations and dynamic predictor selection. Because agents solve multiperiod optimisation problems (households maximise expected lifetime utility and …rms maximise the discounted ‡ow of future pro…ts), their current decisions are in ‡uenced by expectations of the in…nite future and cannot in general be characterised by the Euler equations that typically represent the rational expectations equilibrium of these models. We assume that agents have access to a set of alternative predictors that can be used to form expectations. Agents choose among these predictors based on noisy measures of their recent performance. This dynamic predictor selection generates endogenous ‡uctuations in the proportions of agents using each predictor, contributing to macroeconomic dynamics.
Introduction
The notion that expectations may be a source of economic ‡uctuations has a long history, dating back at least to Pigou (1929) and Keynes (1936) . But the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics invokes rational expectations, which removes the possibility that endogenous changes in expectations formation may be an important source of economic dynamics.
1 And we observe sharp changes in the time series properties of macroeconomic data, that are di¢ cult to account for in standard rational expectations models. Within the rational expectations paradigm the focus has therefore been to investigate structural change or changes in policy to explain these properties, with less attention on the role of expectations.
Of course, academics have long debated the extent to which rational expectations can be considered reasonable a priori. Lucas (1986) argues that: 2 the question whether people are in general "rational"or "adaptive"does not seem to me worth arguing over. Which of these answers is most useful will depend on the situations in which we are trying to predict behavior and on the experiences the people in question have had with such situations.
Monetary policymakers recognise the importance of this question too. Bernanke (2007) has recently asked: "What is the right conceptual framework for thinking about in ‡ation expectations in the current context?" 3 He argues that models of learning are useful deviations from the assumption of rational expectations, which seems inappropriate when there is structural change or uncertainty about policy objectives. Indeed, there is now a vast literature exploring models in which agents update the way they form expectations in the light of new data, capturing learning about the economy. 4 The presence of non-rational expectations creates the potential for dynamic feedback between macroeconomic outcomes and expectations, as discussed, for example, in the Bank of England's February 2008 In ‡ation Report:
There is of course an extensive literature that examines the behaviour of 'indeterminate'rational expectations models. A recent example, applied to monetary policy issues, is Lubik & Schorfheide (2004) . Models of rational behaviour in which rational behaviour gives rise to 'higher order beliefs'have also been examined (see for example, Morris & Shin (2003) ). 2 Page S402. 3 Of course, many policymakers have voiced concerns about the possible sensitivity of the economy to alternative assumptions about the way …rms and households form expectations (see, for example, King (2005) ). 4 A reference is Evans & Honkapohja (2001) . Evans & Honkapohja (2008) provide a review recent literature review, with a focus on monetary policy applications. Sargent (2007) relates the lessons from learning models to a variety of historical episodes. 5 Page 45.
If households'and businesses'medium-term in ‡ation expectations are heavily in‡uenced by their recent experience, then repeated above-target outturns may cause them to place weight on the assumption that in ‡ation will be persistently above
[the in ‡ation target of] 2% If those expectations were built into higher wages and prices, that would raise medium-term in ‡ationary pressures.
In this paper we explore the dynamic feedback between outcomes and expectations in a benchmark New Keynesian model with long-horizon expectations and dynamic predictor selection. We solve the decision rules of households and …rms conditional on their expectations for future events that are outside of their control. In this way the role played by expectations in the model is left explicit, so that spending and price-setting decisions depend on so-called 'longhorizon expectations'as articulated by Preston (2005) . 6 Speci…cally, households'consumption decisions depend on the discounted sum of expected future income and real interest rates and …rms' prices depend on the discounted sum of their expected wage costs, productivity and in ‡ation. A popular alternative approach is to use the behavioural equations of the model under rational expectations -which delivers Euler equations describing spending and in ‡ation -and to replace the (rational) expectations terms with alternative expectations (see, for example, Evans & Honkapohja (2001) ). Both approaches can be defended as descriptions of (distinct) forms of boundedly rational behaviour. We prefer the description implied by the long-horizon expectations approach and employ them in our model.
7
The feedback between outcomes and expectations is generated by dynamic predictor selection: the notion that agents choose between a small set of forecasting rules (or 'predictors') based on noisy observations of past performance. This approach has several advantages.
First, it can bring about time variation in the persistence and variance of macroeconomic variables, as shown by Brazier et al. (2007) . Second, it is consistent with experimental evidence about the way expectations are formed, and the way use of these rules varies over time (see, for example, Anufriev & Hommes (2006) ). And third, it allows di¤erent expectational rules to coexist: and such heterogeneity appears to be a feature of the survey data on expectations. We introduce predictor choice into our long horizon expectations model using the techniques developed by Brock & Hommes (1997) , Brock & de Fontnouvelle (2000) and Branch & Evans (2006) , who in turn take as inspiration the discrete decision, multinomial logit models set out in Manski & McFadden (1981) .
We explore the interaction between the beliefs of …rms and households and the properties of our model economy. We show that ‡uctuations in the expectations formation process -the dynamic predictor selection which occurs endogenously in response to shocks -can bring about changes in the properties of the model that act (at least temporarily) to reinforce the initial change in beliefs. Misperceptions can for a time be self-reinforcing; and this mechanism is a candidate explanation for time-variation in the moments of data. Our approach is to investigate the behaviour of our model when agents have access to a predictor that (wrongly) anticipates that in ‡ation shocks will be long-lasting (motivated in part by the quote from the Bank of England In ‡ation Report above). We show that misperceptions can indeed be temporarily self-reinforcing, leading to marked time-variation in the time series properties of the data. Moreover, this result survives even when agents'misperceptions are generated by a constant-gain learning algorithm.
Our paper is related to several (large) strands of the literature, as noted above. Our work is perhaps most closely related to that of Branch & McGough (2006b) , who introduce heterogeneous expectations in the familiar setting of a New Keynesian model. In subsequent work, Branch & McGough (2006a) endogenise the proportion of agents using each predictor and examine the properties of a set of monetary policy rules. Our main innovations are that we examine predictor choice in the context of a model with long-horizon expectations and we allow one of the predictors to be updated over time via constant gain learning. While Milani (2007) estimates a model in which learning rules with di¤erent gain parameters are dynamically selected, he does not use a model with long-horizon expectations. Moreover, while learning models generally make the important step away from rational expectations by allowing agent's subjective expectations to deviate from those implied by the model, they typically assume homogeneity of expectations across agents. Incorporating dynamic predictor selection allows us both to separate subjective and model-consistent expectations and to introduce heterogeneity of expectations. Our model allows for both heterogeneity of individual agents (eg across di¤erent households) and between types of agents (eg …rms and households may have access to di¤erent sets of predictors).
Section 2 sets out the model, which incorporates standard New Keynesian assumptions.
We also describe the assumptions about expectations formation and the parameterisation of the model. Section 3 presents the results of our application, demonstrating that the presence of misperceptions about the persistence of macroeconomic data can be self-reinforcing. Section 4 concludes.
The model
Here we set out a baseline New Keynesian model and present the solution under alternative assumptions about expectations. A more detailed derivation is presented in Appendix A. So here we focus on the maximisation problems of the agents in the model and the associated log-linearised decision rules. We begin with the familiar rational expectations benchmark in Section 2.1 and in Section 2.2 we turn to the model under non-rational expectations. Since many of the equations carry over from the rational expectations version, we focus discussion on the decision rules of households and …rms.
The rational expectations benchmark
In this section we describe the economic environment faced by agents in our model and characterise optimal behaviour and equilibrium under the assumption that expectations are rational.
Households
There is a continuum of households of unit mass, indexed by i 2 (0; 1). We assume that household i solves:
where c is consumption and h is hours worked and the parameters and are both strictly positive. 8 We use E t to denote the mathematical expectations operator conditional on the information available to the household at date t. We impose the assumption that when making decisions about consumption at date t and beyond, the household has access to data up to and including date t 1. This timing assumption is comparable with the informational assumptions that apply to agents that use non-rational predictors in the analysis of Section 2.2.
More speci…cally, we assume that at the beginning of the period, the household forms a consumption plan before splitting its activities between a 'shopper' and a 'worker'. The shopper enters the goods market and purchases the consumption decided upon in the plan.
The worker enters the labour market and supplies labour according the the intratemporal optimality condition relating consumption and labour supply, given the market wage.
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This type of approach has been used in a variety of rational expectations models under imperfect information, including (for example) Lucas (1980) and Rotemberg & Woodford 8 This rules out the case of linear disutility of work in utility ( = 0). Given our informational assumptions (to be discussed), this case is problematic because households are unable to forecast their total labour income when their labour supply is demand determined. 9 This timing assumption is necessary to ensure that the labour supply responds to meet demand. Given our assumptions about price setting behaviour -explained in Section 2.1.2 -if the household sets either the nominal wage or the amount of labour supplied based solely on date t 1 information, then the real wage is unable to move to the level required to clear the labour market.
(1999). The latter is particularly interesting as it presents a sticky price New Keynesian model with rational expectations, under the assumption that consumption and pricing decisions are made on the basis of information sets that include only lagged values of endogenous variables.
While they do not formally model the labour market, Rotemberg and Woodford's approach is in fact very similar to ours. They assume that households are producers as well as consumers and include the disutility from producing output in the household utility function. Because prices are set in advance of the shocks hitting the economy in the current period, output is demand determined. This means that households will in general produce more or less than they expected at the start of the period. This corresponds to the notion that the 'worker'of the household supplies more or less labour than anticipated at the start of the period in our model.
The household's budget constraint is
where B is the household's holdings of nominal (one period) bonds, W is the nominal wage, R measures the nominal interest rate paid on bonds, D is a collection of transfers (from government and …rms) and P is the nominal price level.
Maximisation of utility gives rise to an Euler equation in consumption which can be written in log-linearised form as:ĉ
where we use the notationx t ln (x t =x) for each variable x t to denote its log-deviation from its steady-state value, x. Our worker-shopper assumption means that the labour supply relationship is given by:
Firms
We assume that there are two types of …rms -retailers and producers -and we consider each of them in turn.
Retailers are perfectly competitive and operate a production technology that combines the inputs of producers using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology:
10 The equation in the text di¤ers from the planned labour supply at the start of the period (given bŷ
t ) because the real wage adjusts to clear the labour market.
where x j is the quantity of output purchased from producer j, z is a productivity shock and > 0. We assume that the log-linearised behaviour of the shock z iŝ
where u z is an iid shock and j z j < 1.
Retailers sell their output to consumers and the government at nominal price P . Denoting the price of output purchased from producer j as P j , the cost-minimising price index for output is
and the associated demand curve for the output of producer j is:
The set of producers j 2 (0; 1) produce di¤erentiated products that form a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle consumed by households and the government. They produce using a constant returns in the single input (labour):
where a t is a stochastic aggregate productivity term (common to all producers) and we assume that log-linearised productivity follows a simple AR(1) process:
where u a is an iid shock and j a j < 1.
Aggregating the production function across producers, combined with the production function of retailers, and log-linearising gives:
The real pro…t of producer j is:
Under a Calvo pricing scheme, the objective function for a producer that is able to reset prices is thus: where represents the stochastic discount factor of a representative household and 0 < 1 is the probability that the producer is not allowed to reset its price each period. As in the treatment of households, we assume that the producer's expectations are conditional on the information available up to the end of period t 1.
The log-linearised …rst order condition for newly set prices can be combined with the log-linearised expression for the retailer's price index to give:
which is a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. 12 In this expression, we have substituted out for the expectations of the future shock z t+1 using the agents'knowledge of the process driving it and the fact that their information set is based on date t 1 information.
Government and market clearing
The government budget constraint is:
where B g is nominal government debt (one period bonds), R is the nominal interest rate,
) is nominal spending and P is nominal tax revenue. 13 In real terms:
and we assume that the government issues no debt:
for all periods t. This means that the government runs a balanced budget each quarter and government spending is …nanced by (lump sum) tax revenue. The log-linearised expression for government spending is:ĝ
12 Under the conventional assumption that expectations are based on information up to and including date t we can exploit the fact that E t^ t =^ t and equation 6 becomes the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve:
13 We consider our model as the 'cashless limit' (Woodford (2003)) of an economy in which households demand …at money, the issuance of which generates seignoreige for the government. We do so for analytical convenience since the inclusion of money would create an additional choice variable and associated decision rule for households.
where 0 g 1 and u g t is iid. Monetary policy is conducted using a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing and an iid shock, which has the log-linearised representation:
Market clearing dictates that all output is consumed by households or government:
where g is a parameter denoting the steady-state share of government expenditure in output.
The model under non-rational expectations
In this section we consider a variant of the model in which households and …rms hold nonrational expectations. We will assume that households and …rms employ relatively simple forecasting rules or 'predictors'to form their expectations. So in what follows, we will use the term 'predictors'as a shorthand for non-rational expectations.
The key point in this setup is that di¤erent agents may use di¤erent predictors and therefore make di¤erent decisions. This means that we need to pay attention to the heterogeneity across agents and then aggregate appropriately. Here we focus on how the decision rules of households and …rms are a¤ected by the use of non-rational expectations. We assume throughout that households (and …rms) make their current decisions on the basis of their currently held expectations, without factoring in the possibility that those expectations will evolve as new information arrives. This is the 'anticipated utility' assumption that is extensively used in the literature on least squares learning. 14 The anticipated utility approach makes it easier to write down the decision rules of individual households and …rms, since they do not depend on the entire sequence of future forecasting rules that may be chosen and is thus very useful in delivering a tractable version of the model.
Households
As before we start with an individual household among the continuum of households of unit mass. Household i 2 (0; 1) solves:
The anticipated utility approach was introduced by Kreps (1998) . Recent work by Cogley & Sargent (2006) indicates that, in some circumstances, behaviour under anticipated utility can outperform that under rational expectations as an approximation to fully optimal behaviour. subject to
where now we use the notationẼ i to denote the expectations of household i. The '~'notation signals that the expectation is not rational and the i subscript makes it clear that the expectation is speci…c to the individual household.
The Lagrangean for the problem is formed in the same way as in the rational expectations version and gives rise to the same …rst order conditions for c i , h i and b i , though with the expectation operatorẼ i;t 1 in place of the rational expectations operator E t 1 . The appendix demonstrates that the household's consumption is given by:
Equation 11 
Firms
Since retailers do not form expectations, their behaviour is una¤ected. And the environment faced by producers is essentially the same as that described in Section 2.1.2 though in this case the expectations of producer j is denoted as the (non-rational) expectation E j;t . A producer j given the chance to reset its price maximises:
The assumption of non-rational expectations is not the only way in which long-horizon expectations may matter. For example, Rotemberg & Woodford (1999) assume that the information delay di¤ers across …rms so that expectations based on information at dates t 1 and t 2 are relevant for pricing behaviour at date t. This assumption means that the conventional representation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve cannot be uncovered -so long-horizon expectations remain in their aggregate supply curve -see equation 22 on page 65 of Rotemberg & Woodford (1999) .
which has a …rst order condition given by:
where we de…ne the price set by producer j relative to the previous period's aggregate price level as:
and the relative in ‡ation factor t;s
::: t for s t where we normalise by the aggregate price level from the previous period because this is contained in producers'information set.
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Appendix A shows that linearising around the steady state described in Section A.1.4 gives the following pricing equation:
which makes it clear that if producers have di¤erent expectations about future costs and future in ‡ation, then they will set di¤erent prices even when free to set them simultaneously.
Aggregation
To continue with the description of the model under heuristic expectations, we need to aggregate decisions of consumers and …rms. We assume that there are a …nite set of 'heuristics'or 'predictors'available to each group of agents. From this point on we will use the index i (j)
to denote the decisions of a household (…rm) using predictor i 2 f1; :::; Ig (j 2 f1; :::; Jg).
This is appropriate if all agents that use the same predictors make the same decisions, which is the case if there is no dependence of current decisions on past decisions. Since households have access to …nancial assets that can be carried between periods, we need to carefully consider the aggregation of household decisions over time. Though the government issues a zero supply of one period nominal bonds each period, individual consumers can in principle trade with each other using these bonds. While the total net (private) supply of bonds across the population is zero (by market clearing) an individual household may carry forward a positive or negative bond position from the previous period, re ‡ecting surprise 16 Conventional treatments usually de…ne the relative price of a …rm j in terms of the current aggregate price level: p j;t P j;t =P t . There is no loss of generality in following our approach.
income gains and losses. 17 Fortunately, since we know that consumption plans are a linear function of previously accumulated …nancial assets, we can aggregate across households under reasonable assumptions. For example, aggregation is straightforward if we assume that the groups of households using each predictor (which pins down their view of human wealth) are either …xed or randomly drawn from the population as a whole.
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We assume that the mass of households (…rms) using predictor i (j) is given by n i (m j ) where
This means that the model equations can be written as follows. The average re-set price of producers iŝ
where, for each j 2 f1; :::; Jg, m j is the fraction of producers setting pricep j. and in ‡ation is
given by:
The linearised resource constraint and monetary policy rule are the same as in the rational expectations model:ŷ
The average level of consumption is:
17 Consider a household that starts the period with no …nancial assets (bonds) and an overly pessimistic view of the future stream of future earnings. This household chooses to consume relatively little and receives a positive surprise when income exceeds expenditure during the period and hence ends the period with a higher level of …nancial assets than they had planned at the start of the period. Similarly, there will be other households that receive a negative surprise about net income and accumulate fewer bonds than they had anticipated. 18 When the proportions are …xed over time, aggregate consumption depends linearly on the total bond holdings of households in the previous period (which sum to zero by market clearing). When the proportions change over time, but are composed of randomly selected households, the law of large numbers implies that the average …nancial wealth of households in each cohort is zero. Other assumptions can be made, though will typically require additional equations to keep track of the wealth distribution.
where we use the fact that bond market clearing requires:
for all s.
Speci…cation of expectations
So far we have considered households' and …rms' decisions without taking a stand on how they form expectations. In this section we assume that they use backward-looking predictors, and specify a general form for those predictors. We also describe how households and …rms choose which predictors to use: this allows us to complete the description of the model by providing an account of how the predictor proportions n i , (i = 1; :::; I ) and m j (j = 1; :::; J)
are determined.
In the rest of this paper, and without loss of generality, we assume that I = J = 2. For notation convenience for households we denote n 1 = n so that n 2 = 1 n. Similarly for …rms
we use the notation m 1 = m so that m 2 = 1 m. We assume that the fraction using each predictor evolves according to the observed forecast errors for that predictor. In particular the proportion n at date t is determined by:
where h is a 4 1 vector of 'intensities of choice'and h 1;t h 2;t is the 4 1 vector of the di¤erences of '…tness measures' for the variables of interest for households (ŵ;d;R and^ ).
The …tness measures are de…ned as geometric averages of past squared errors:
where h > 0 speci…es the speed at which past mean squared errors are discounted (or equivalently, the e¤ective window of past forecast errors that are used to evaluate the predictors).
We similarly assume that the choice of m is governed by:
where f is a 3 1 vector of intensities of choice and 
This form permits a wide variety of forecasting models. For example, if we assume that the fourth column of G is equal to a zero vector and specify F so that the largest eigenvalue is less than 1 in magnitude, then expectations will ultimately converge to the steady state values of endogenous variables described in Section A.1.4. Setting both the F and G matrices to zero generates the 'steady state predictors'analysed in Brazier et al. (2007) .
This approach means that, for …rms, we have: The current period decisions for consumption and prices depend on discounted sums of expected future outturns. We can transform our VAR forecasting model to perform these summations. So for example, for some arbitrary F , G and discount rate 2 (0; 1) we have:
which is valid as long as the eigenvalues of F are all less than 1 in absolute magnitude.
Two equations in the model contain terms with expectation operators: …rms'price equation and households'consumption equation. Starting with …rms, we have:
Now we can use the VAR representation of expectations and perform the summations as above using the VAR coe¢ cient matrices. We use selector matrices -denoted S : -to pick out the summation of the forecast for the variable of interest: thus S x is the matrix that selects the forecast error for the variable x. So the pricing equation can be written as:
Collecting terms, and de…ning V f;j (I F f;j ) 1 gives:
Analogous arguments can be applied to the consumption equation of households giving:
where, V h;i (I F h;i ) 1 and
Model parameters
The parameters can be divided into two groups. First, the so-called 'deep'parameters of the model describe the preferences and constraints of households and …rms and must be speci…ed in order to solve the model under rational expectations. Second, the parameters that are speci…c to the non rational expectations version of the model. We consider each group in turn.
' Deep'parameters
The table below documents the choice of the key parameters of the model. The calibration of is standard in this type of model as is the choice of (implying a duration of price contracts of one year). We calibrate and g representing the, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the share of government spending in output from the estimates of Nelson & Nikolov (2002) using UK data. We also set the variance of the productivity process ( 2 a = (1 2 a )) to be the same as their estimates, though we choose a lower persistence ( a ). The reason for this choice is to allow the potential for the model to generate endogenous changes in persistence that do not depend on the forcing processes driving the model. Similarly we choose a low value for the autocorrelation of the government spending process ( g ) and we set its variance equal to the variance of the productivity process. We assume that the cost push shocks have a relatively low persistence ( z ) and variance ( 2 z ) compared with the other shocks. This choice is designed to ensure that cost push shocks play a relatively minor role so that there is some scope for misperceptions about those shocks to generate somewhat di¤erent views about the behaviour of the economy. This is an important aspect of the application we present in Section 3.
The speci…cation of the monetary policy rule implies long-run coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and output ( and y ) in line with Taylor (1993) and a moderate degree of interest rate smoothing r = 0:25. Again, we want to allow the predictor choice mechanisms to have some potential to materially a¤ect the persistence and variability of the variables in the model. The variance of monetary policy shocks is consistent with the midpoint of a range of estimates of Taylortype rules on UK data. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply ( 1 ) is somewhat larger than typical empirical estimates from DSGE models (see for example Smets & Wouters (2003) ).
This assumption helps to keep the overall variability of the model in a plausible range and is important given the key role of the real wage in clearing the labour market. The elasticity of demand in product markets 1 is set to imply a markup of 10% which is in line with estimates using UK data.
' Expectations'parameters
The expectations parameters are those that govern the predictor choice mechanism. The 'intensities of choice'determine the extent to which agents switch to better performing predictors. So, for households, the proportion of households choosing predictor 1 (of the two available) is given by equation (13) introduced in Section 2.2.4. The vector h represents the intensities of choice for the household. If each element of h tends to in…nity, then all agents immediately switch to the best performing predictor (as measured by the average di¤erence in mean squared error). Conversely, if each element of h tends to zero, agents are indi¤erent between the two predictors, regardless of their relative performance so that n = 1 n = 0:5.
The mapping described by this function can be motivated by appealing to a story in which agents observe the true relative predictor performance with noise. The extreme of in…nitely large h elements corresponds to the case in which the variance of noise is zero and the extreme of h = 0 corresponds to a situation in which the variance of the noise is in…nitely large. As described in Section 2.2.4, there is an analogous function that governs the choice of predictors by …rms and the intensities of choice in this function ( f ) are calibrated jointly with those for households.
Because the intensities of choice a¤ect the choice of predictors by households and …rms, the choice of these parameters is clearly important for the behaviour of the model. Our approach to calibrating them is based on the view that we want the elements of the h and f to compensate for the fact that some variables that agents forecast may be far more volatile than others. For example, the household must forecast dividend payments, which could be signi…cantly more volatile than other variables that the household forecasts (for example in ‡ation). Our strategy proceeds in two steps. First, we set the elements of f h ; f g so that each element of an 'average …tness measure'vector is equalised " n The other parameters that are important for the dynamic behaviour of the model are those that control the extent to which agents discount past mean squared errors when computing the …tness measure. We set these parameters to h = 0:03 and f = 0:06, based on gain parameters estimated using survey measures of in ‡ation expections. [To be completed].
Self-reinforcing misperceptions
In this section we explore the interaction between the beliefs of …rms and households and the properties of our model economy. We show that ‡uctuations in the expectations formation process -the dynamic predictor selection which occurs endogenously in response to shocks -can bring about changes in the properties of the model that act (at least temporarily) to reinforce the initial change in beliefs. Misperceptions can for a time be self-reinforcing; and this mechanism is a candidate explanation for time-variation in the moments of data.
Our approach is to investigate the behaviour of our model when agents have access to a predictor that (wrongly) anticipates that in ‡ation shocks will be long-lasting. We start by motivating our experiments, before detailing how we have implemented misperceptions, and reporting results. Finally, we contrast the results with the case in which agents have access to a constant-gain learning algorithm.
Misperceptions about macroeconomic persistence
The idea that changes in beliefs may become self reinforcing is one that is of obvious concern to policymakers. In particular, the risk that elevated in ‡ation expectations can become embedded in the wage and price setting process is one that monetary policy makers seek to
avert. This is illustrated by the quote from the Bank of England's February 2008 In ‡ation
Report, cited in the Introduction:
If households'and businesses'medium-term in ‡ation expectations are heavily in‡uenced by their recent experience, then repeated above-target outturns may cause them to place weight on the assumption that in ‡ation will be persistently above 2%. If those expectations were built into higher wages and prices, that would raise medium-term in ‡ationary pressures.
The quote recognises the potential for beliefs about the economy (expectations of persistently high in ‡ation) to lead to changes in behaviour (higher wages and prices) that reinforce that belief (higher medium-term in ‡ationary pressure).
We use this concern on the part of policymakers to motivate our analysis in this section.
We explore the extent to which, if agents begin to use predictors that embed assumptions of greater macroeconomic persistence, these beliefs may become self-reinforcing. And we study whether this type of mechanism can materially a¤ect the behaviour of our model economy, and generate time-variation in the moments of the data generated by the model.
Implementing misperceptions in our model
To place some structure on the beliefs that agents in our model hold, we consider the following scenario. In line with our focus on non-rational expectations, we limit all agents in the model to forecast using AR(1) forecasting rules. A forecasting rule that serves as a natural benchmark in this environment is one that brings about a form of restricted perceptions equilibrium. 20 When all agents hold these beliefs, the data generating process of the model is such that, subject to their restricted perceptions, agents'beliefs are con…rmed. With this in mind, we posit that households and …rms are unsure about the degree of persistence in the variables on which their decisions depend. Speci…cally, agents choose between two alternative restricted perception forecasting rules: a benchmark rule consistent with the true processes for the shocks in the economy (the best-performing AR(1) forecasting rule, if all agents share these beliefs, which we call the restricted perceptions predictor or RPP); and an alternative rule consistent with the misperception that the cost-push shock is persistent ( z = 0:9), when in fact it is not. We call the second predictor the 'misperceptions predictor'(MP).
The alternative beliefs are reported in Table 1 , which lists the AR(1) coe¢ cients that characterise our two forecasting rules. We run 500 simulations of 4000 periods each, using the model calibration detailed in Section 2.3, allowing agents to choose between the forecasting rules as described. We discard the …rst 2000 periods of data from each run and compute statistics on the remaining periods. We focus on the distribution of variance and persistence 
Implications of misperceptions
When agents can choose between the two forecasting rules, the model generates time-variation in the moments of the data. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the distribution of variance estimates (the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles). Figure 1 plots a kernel density estimate of the distribution of variance estimates for in ‡ation. Similarly, Table 3 and Figure 2 charaterise the distribution of persistence estimates. The simple measure of persistence used is the …rst-order serial correlation coe¢ cient (allowing for a constant term in the regression).
For in ‡ation and interest rates, the median estimates of variance and persistence are markedly higher in the misperceptions case than when expectations are rational. Output is more variable but no more persistent. Moreover, the distributions are positively skewed, indicating the model's ability to generate periods of particularly volatile or persistent outcomes.
This is a direct consequence of the non-linearity that the predictor switching mechanism entails. The top panel of Figure 3 shows an illustrative run of simulated data, comparing in the blue and green lines respectively the paths for in ‡ation when all agents'beliefs coincide with the RPP, and when agents are allowed to switch between the RPP and the MP. At the start of the period the paths for in ‡ation are little di¤erent under the alternative assumptions about beliefs. Consistent with this, the dashed green line in the second panel of the …gure is close to 0, indicating that almost all …rms'beliefs are given by the RPP. After about 40 periods a succession of large negative draws of the productivity shock begins to push in ‡ation up. At this time the behaviour of in ‡ation is more accurately forecasted by the MP, which embodies the misperceived belief that the cost-push shock, and hence in ‡ation, is highly persistent.
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Large forecast errors for the RPP cause households and …rms to switch to the MP. With more persistent beliefs about the in ‡ation process, lagged in ‡ation gains higher weight in the price setting process, and actual in ‡ation is more persistent also. In this sense, the shift towards the misperceived beliefs is self-reinforcing.
Misperceptions through constant gain learning
Our experiments so far have allowed for agents' beliefs to be consistent with an arbitrary misperception. But there are plausible mechanisms through which such misperceptions may arise endogenously in response to realisations of data. One example that has received much attention in the literature is adaptive learning (see Honkapohja and Evans 2001) . In this section we explore whether agents in our model choose to use a constant-gain learning process to inform their expectations, when they have a choice between learning and the RPP that we have described already. We …nd that at times they do, and that this has qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller e¤ects on the time series properties of the model economy compared to the arbitrary misperceptions case we described earlier.
We repeated exactly the same set of experiments as in the previous section, now allowing agents to switch between the RPP and a forecasting rule informed by a constant-gain learning The third panel of Figure 3 shows the AR(1) coe¢ cient for in ‡ation estimated under the learning processes used by …rms and households. As in ‡ation rises, so does its estimated persistence. The performance of the learning and RPP predictors diverge, and …rms and households switch to using the learning predictor (as illustrated in the second panel of the Figure) . This tends to increase the persistence of in ‡ation; and so on.
In general learning mitigates the ‡uctuations in in ‡ation that occur in the case where the alternative to the RPP predictor is the (…xed) MP. However at times learning can result in beliefs that are closer to the MP, and the behaviour of the economy alters accordingly. So we cannot rule out that endogenously generated ‡uctuations in beliefs can be self-reinforcing, and generate time variation in economic dynamics. As noted in the main text, household i solves:
The Lagrangean for the problem is:
and the …rst order conditions for c i , h i and b i are:
A.1.2 Firms
As noted in the text, the …rst order condition for a producer resetting its price at date t is:
if we de…ne the price set by …rm j relative to the previous period's aggregate price level as:
::: t for s t where we normalise by the aggregate price level from the previous period because this is contained in …rms'information set.
Since all …rms are identical in terms of their information and production constraints, all …rms that are able to change prices at date t will choose the same price, which we denote as p t . Thus
The reatiler's price is:
where the equality follows from grouping the …rms into cohorts according to the date at which they last reset their price and noting that the mass of …rms that have not reset their price since date t k is (1 ) k . This means that the aggregate price level can be written as
A.1.3 Government and market clearing
where B g is nominal government debt (one period bonds), R is the nominal interest rate, G is nominal spending and P is nominal tax revenue. 21 In real terms:
21 We consider our model as the 'cashless limit ' (Woodford (2003) ) of an economy in which households demand …at money, the issuance of which generates seignoreige for the government. We do so for analytical convenience since the inclusion of money would create an additional choice variable and associated decision rule for households.
for all periods t. This means that the government runs a balanced budget each quarter and government spending is …nanced by tax revenue. Government spending follows an exogenous process:
where 0 g 1 and u g t is iid. We use g to denote the steady state level of government spending.
Monetary policy is conducted using a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing and an iid shock:
where again variables without subscripts are steady-state values.
A corollary of this market clearing condition is that the market for nominal one period bonds also clears. This requires that
where b agg t denotes the real-valued supply of all (private and publicly issued) nominal bonds.
Given that government debt issuance is zero, we require that the net supply of private bonds is zero: b t = 0. Because all households are identical, this means that no consumer issues or holds debt in equilibrium. Another implication of this assumption is that all households choose the same level of consumption:
As noted in Section 2.1.1, the 'worker'of the household supplies labour according to the intratemporal labour supply condition based on the market real wage:
Finally, the total transfers to consumers consist of dividends net of lump sum taxes:
in equilibrium this is given by:
A.1.4 Steady state
We now consider a steady state around which the model equations will be linearised. We assume that steady-state in ‡ation (ie the in ‡ation target) is = 1 which means that the Euler equation gives
Since steady-state productivities are a = z = 1, this immediately this implies:
and from market clearing and the speci…cation of steady state government spending, we have:
c = 1 g y where g is the (exogenous) steady state share of government procurement in output.
From the pricing equation in steady state, we see that:
Using the results above in the labour supply function implies
which means that if we choose the weight on disutility from work to be
then the steady state solution satis…es
These observations allow us to express steady-state dividends as:
This equality follows from the fact that …rm's output x is remunerated at a price equal to the aggregate price level adjusted by the factor z 1 as shown in the main text. Since (to a …rst order approximation) y = z x the revenue from selling x is equivalent to the value of retail output.
A.1.5 Log-linearised model under rational expectations
We now log-linearise the model equations around the steady state analysed in Section A.1.4.
We denotek t ln (k t =k) as the log deviation of k t from its steady state level k. Linearising the …rst order condition for consumption 14 and labour supply 18 (using the linearised …rst order condition for bond holdings 16) giveŝ
The linearised resource constraint iŝ
and the process for government spending satis…eŝ
The linearised monetary policy rule iŝ
The production function implies that 24 y t ẑ t =â t +ĥ t
where productivity follows the processâ
The pricing equation implies that
where the …nal equality makes use of the law of iterated conditional expectations. Linearising the expression for the aggregate price level gives:
Using this information in the log-linearised pricing equation gives:
which is a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Note that here we have substituted out for the expectations (based on date t 1 information) of the z shock. Equations 19-26
can be solved for the eight variables in the model: nĉ ;ĥ;ŷ;R;â;ĝ;^ ;ŵ o .
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A.2 The model under non-rational expectations
Here we focus on how the decision rules of households and …rms are a¤ected by the use of non-rational expectations. We will linearise the model equations around the same steady state analysed in Section A.1.4 and many of the linearised equations will carry across from the rational expectations case presented in Section A.1.5.
A.3 Households
As noted in the main text, household i 2 (0; 1) solves:
The Lagrangean for the problem is formed in the same way as in the rational expectations version and gives rise to the following …rst order conditions for c i , h i and b i :
for s = t; t + 1; :::. The only di¤erence from the rational expectations case at this stage is that the expectations operatorẼ i;t 1 replaces the rational expectations operator E t 1 .
To proceed, we …rst log-linearise the equations around the steady state described in Section A.1.4. As beforex t ln (x t =x) denotes the log deviation of x t from its steady state level x.
We also de…nex t (x t x) as the absolute di¤erence of x t from its steady state. The latter will be used for bond holdings, since we linearise around a steady state in which bond market clearing implies b = 0. Linearising gives: 0
where we make use of the fact that in the steady state: R= = 1; w = 1 ; h = 1; d = g and c = 1 g .
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To derive the decision rules, we begin with the budget constraint 27. We know that:
(1 ) ŵ t +ĥ i;t Repeated substitution in this fashion yields: are not allowed to believe that they can increase their borrowing faster than the …nancing requirements in the long run. Imposing this assumption means that we will be able to derive a consumption function from the conventional condition stating that the households's expected consumption stream exhausts the present value of their expected net income.
How strong is this assumption? Under rational expectations, conditions of this type will generally hold (at least along the equilibrium path if not under more general conditions). But there is no reason to assume that the behaviour of a household with arbitrary expectations over future events will satisfy this constraint. This means that our model e¤ectively focuses attention on expectations schemes that have 'sensible' long-run properties. Moreover, in principle we should check on a case-by-case basis whether the expectations implied by the forecasting rules that we consider satisfy this constraint. We expect that general 'VAR' expectations of the form considered in Section 2.2.4 will satisfy this constraint as long as the eigenvalues in the projection matrices are not too large. It is not clear, however, that ruling out 'bubble' solutions in consumption decisions o¤ers the best chance of generating strong expectational dynamics: laboratory experiments with subjects based on asset pricing models suggest that trend following behaviour can coordinate expectations on paths that look (locally) like explosive bubble solutions as shown by Anufriev & Hommes (2006) .
To proceed, we combine 28 and 29 to give: 
and that in generalẼ
for s = t + 1; t + 2; ::: where
R s 1 ^ s s = t + 1; t + 2; :::
Putting this into 32 gives:
which can be written as: 
A.4 Firms
The environment faced by …rms is essentially the same as that described in Section 2.1.2.
To analyse their optimal pricing decision, we begin with a version of the pricing equation 17 derived in Section 2. where in this case the only di¤erence from equation 17 is that the expectation of …rm j is denoted as the (non-rational) expectation E j;t 1 .
Linearising around the steady state described in Section A.1.4 gives: As explained in the text, we assume that there are a …nite set of 'predictors'available to each group of agents. From this point on we will use the index i (j) to denote the decisions of a household (…rm) using predictor i 2 f1; :::; Ig (j 2 f1; :::; Jg). The mass of households (…rms) using predictor i (j) is given by n i (m j ) where
This means that the model equations can be written as follows. The average re-set price of …rms iŝ p t = P J j=1 m j;tpj;t = (1 ) P J j=1 m j;t E j;t 1 P 1 s=t ( ) s t (ŵ s â s ) + P J j=1 m j;t E j;t 1 P 1 s=t ( ) s t^ s where, for each j 2 f1; :::; Jg, m j is the fraction of …rms setting pricep j. .
In ‡ation is given by:^ where we use the fact that bond market clearing requires:
n i;sbi;s = 0 for all s.
Turning to the labour market, we note that our assumptions about the worker/shopper behaviour of the household gives:ŵ t = ĥ t + ĉ t where we exploit the log-linear form of the labour supply choice of the household's 'worker'.
Noting thatĥ t =ŷ t â t ẑ t = 1 g ĉ t + gĝ t â t ẑ t we have:
In this version of the model we need to solve out for net dividends since households must forecast this variable when making their consumption plans. We can see that the de…nition of dividends and the market clearing conditions imply:
in equilibrium this is given by: 
B Calibration of the intensities of choice
The procedure for setting the elements of is a simple iterative one. We start with an initial guess for and solve for the predictor proportions (m ; n ) that represent the …xed point of the following mappings: m = T f (m ; n) n = T h (m; n ) which solve for the optimal asymptotic values of m and n as a function of the pair (m; n) : 27 To derive the mapping T f we perform the following experiment. For each value of n we …nd the m which would be generated asymptotically by the predictor choice mapping (that is if the predictor proportions remained at n and m ) forever. The T h mapping is constructed analogously and the point (m ; n ) represents the intersection of these curves in (m; n) space.
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With this information in hand we examine whether where " > 0 is a small number and the mean squared errors are evaluated (as the notation suggests) using the asymptotic representation of the model with predictor proportions (m ; n ).
If this condition is satis…ed we stop the process and accept the vector . If it is not satis…ed we try another guess for . The sequence of guesses are guided by a numerical optimisation procedure.
This approach, though arbitrary, ensures that predictor choice is not dominated by the behaviour of a subset of very volatile variables. There are other ways that we could calibrate the intensities of choice which we intend to examine in further work. One approach might be to replace the vector with a vector of weights representing the relative importance of each variable to household's utility or …rm's pro…ts. Another would be to use evidence from predictor choice models that have been …tted to behaviour observed in laboratory experiments as in Anufriev & Hommes (2006) . 27 These mappings are similar to the 'T-maps'considered in the predictor choice literature -see for example Branch (2004) . 28 Our approach assumes that this point is unique, though it need not be. For our applications, however, there is indeed a unique point.
